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Plessner and Betsch’s (2001) investigation into officiating behavior may be 
representative of a shift from stress-orientated research (Anshel & Weinberg, 1995; 
Rainey & Winterich, 1995; Stewart & Ellery, 1996) to consideration of decision-
making (Craven, 1998; Ford, Gallagher, Lacy, Bridwell & Goodwin, 1999; Oudejans, 
Verheijen, Bakker, Gerrits, Steinbuckner & Beek, 2000), the primary function of 
referees in any sport. Commendably, Plessner and Betsch have investigated the most 
important focus of referee performance, the application of the rules (Anshel, 1995). 
However, methodological weaknesses, together with a fundamental error in the 
attribution of causation to the findings, significantly dilute this paper’s contribution to 
extending knowledge in this important area. 
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The Art of Reason versus the Exactness of Science in Elite Refereeing: 
Comments on Plessner and Betsch (2001) 
As sport becomes more pressured, referees are ever more accountable for their 
decisions and, reflecting this performance demand, governing bodies now sanction, or even 
demote referees when they apply the laws inconsistently (The Guardian, 2001). The 
performance emphasis, both for the referees themselves and for the sports, makes this an 
area worthy of investigation by sport scientists. Therefore, Plessner and Betsch (2001) 
should be commended for their research into referee decision-making in soccer. 
Plessner and Betsch studied the decisions made by 58 referees and 57 players on 20 
videotaped scenes taken from a Spanish Primera Division soccer match. The use of 
videotaped scenarios to study this area is laudable, since video provides detailed 
presentations of events in real time, in which content can be manipulated (Cannon-Bowers 
& Bell, 1997). It allows different participants to independently consider an event that holds 
exactly the same information so that crucial comparisons can be made, and the paper 
represents an excellent step in examining this important domain. However, the paper also 
reflects a methodological flaw, a design weakness and a questionable interpretation which, 
singularly and in combination, serve to limit the paper’s contribution to this important area. 
First, the methodological flaw. Plessner and Betsch apparently failed to match the 
testing perspective to the referee’s usual view, employing a spectator’s perspective as 
opposed to the “in the thick of it” angle that officials experience. Accordingly, the study 
has forfeited ecological validity, which may in turn have nullified the benefits of the 
referees’ expertise (Abernethy, Thomas & Thomas, 1993; Chamberlain & Coelho 1993; 
Williams & Davids, 1995). This contention is also well supported by the literature on 
naturalistic decision making, which suggests the need for a familiar perspective since an 
alternative angle may differ in important detail, distorting both the complexity and 
dynamics of a situation (Omodei, Wearing & McLennan, 1997; Stokes, Kemper & Kite, 
1997). 
A recent study of elite rugby-union referees and their coaches also highlighted the 
importance of the viewing angle. Here, the referee coaches, a group who are used to seeing 
games from the sideline, were up to 10% less accurate at making correct decisions when 
presented with the referees’ perspective (Mascarenhas, Collins & Mortimer, 1999). In 
short, different perspectives may generate different decisions, a situation that is exacerbated 
when the participants are asked to execute decision-making tasks from an unfamiliar 
perspective. 
Interestingly, Plessner and Betsch’s results seem to support this contention. They 
reveal that, in the game from which their test footage was culled, the original referee only 
gave a penalty in the second situation, although on video this offense was less clear than the 
first. It is perhaps not surprising that only 18% (13 out of 72) of the participants made the 
same decision as the original referee in both situations. The sideline perspective may well 
have distorted important information, and thus eradicated or limited the application of the 
referees’ expertise. Unfortunately, since the reasoning that underpinned the participants’ 
decisions was not tested, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions. 
Our second concern, the design flaw, also relates to this factor of expertise. By 
combining referees and players, Plessner and Betsch compare participants who surely must 
be unalike in their capacity to make refereeing decisions. In fact, the similarity in 
performance of these two “subsamples” on the tests implies that the design is flawed. It 
seems obvious that referees should be better at decision-making on rule application than 
players (whatever players might think!) since that is their primary task. This contention 
receives support from the work of Williams and Davids (1995), who showed increased 
expertise associated with actively doing rather than just passively watching soccer. Players 
don’t regularly make rule decisions, whereas referees do. Future studies on referee 
decision-making need to use referees, specifically those with sufficient practice and 
expertise at their craft, if useful data are to be accrued concerning subsequent enhancement 
of performance. 
Finally, to the questionable interpretation. One’s consideration of reasons that 
underpin decisions provides a sensitive measure of knowledge (Abraham & Collins, 1998) 
and reveals the individual’s level of understanding (Klinger, 2000; Langan-Fox, Code & 
Langfield-Smith, 2000). Unfortunately, while Plessner and Betsch ably demonstrated that 
the probability of awarding a penalty increased if no penalty had been awarded to the same 
team before, there is no evidence to show the nature of the association between these two 
decisions since they didn’t ask why these decisions were awarded. As such, the results may 
represent the game-dysfunctional but perhaps understandable socio-psychological 
phenomenon of making contingencies to “balance things out,” which is deemed illegal by 
FIFA rules. If so, as asserted by Plessner and Betsch, this presents a problem. However, 
without an analysis of the rationale behind decisions, it is equally plausible to draw other 
conclusions; in fact, these conclusions fit well with the functions which referees are 
required to fulfill. 
Referees are asked to adjudicate games by exercising the rules and accounting for the 
spirit of the rules (Askins, 2001; Grunska, 2001). Crucially, Grunska (2001) also suggests 
that referees are increasingly encouraged to establish a “feel for the game,” where the aim 
is to be realistic rather than literal in applying the rules. This is termed game management, 
and represents the art rather than the science of refereeing which is essential in the real 
world. Thus, expert referees make decisions that are appropriate for the nuances of a 
particular game, allowing the game to flow, using the whistle only when the consequences 
for not doing so may adversely affect the tempo or temper of the game. Such “judicious 
use” of the whistle is a rational, game-management focused act, which is not only 
praiseworthy but also an essential skill for an elite referee (Bunting, 1999; Wilson, 2000; C. 
High, Rugby Football Union elite referee development manager, personal communication, 
Oct. 2, 2001). Indeed in elite rugby, anecdotal evidence from rugby referees and their 
assessors, as well as RFU referee technical literature (Bunting, 1999), sees game 
management as the most important aspect of a referee’s skill set. 
Therefore, a more positive attribution to Plessner and Betsch’s findings would be that 
the participants felt that the game intensity had increased and the players were becoming 
more physical. So, in order to restrain this escalation of physical contact and prevent further 
discrepancies, they would logically, and within the letter and spirit of their prescribed 
duties, decide to award the penalty. Whatever the case, without a thorough analysis of the 
participants’ reasons it is unclear whether decisions were due to a contrast effect as 
suggested by Plessner and Betsch, or to some other more game management focused 
rationale. 
 
Discussion 
 
Reinforcing the need to analyze the reasons underpinning decisions, and in light of 
our second comment presented earlier, it is worth noting that Plessner and Betsch asserted 
that there were no differences between the referees and the players. We would suggest that 
investigating the rationale behind decisions would significantly delineate the referees from 
the players (cf. Rutt-Leas & Chi, 1993). In this regard, and further to the previous 
paragraph, research reveals that referees take into consideration things such as the previous 
levels of contact in the game and the potential consequences of their decisions 
(Mascarenhas, Collins & Mortimer, 2002). This level of understanding seems to be a 
function of the referees’ expertise at making these types of decisions, an attribute that the 
players only encounter as a third party. 
Similarly, Klein (1993) would argue that by failing to match the time pressure that 
exists in the real-world environment, namely refereeing out on the field of play, you are not 
testing their real ability to make refereeing decisions. As such, it is perhaps predictable that 
the players are equally as skilled (or in this case, perhaps unskilled) in their decision-
making as the referees. Since both groups have essentially been tested as spectators, 
without time pressure and a familiar perspective, neither have been examined in their own 
specific areas of experience. In this regard, Cohen (1993) argues that examining decision 
biases with a naturalistic perspective opens to question some of the basic assumptions of 
the decision-bias research. Cohen suggests that the naturalistic domain helps to answer 
“what is the actual impact of each bias in real-world domains?” and questions whether the 
dynamic quality of real tasks, as opposed to the Plessner and Betsch lab task, helps reduce 
the effects of biases. 
Furthermore, Smith and Marshall (1997) suggest that decision-making, in the 
absence of complete knowledge of the complexity of situations, often requires some form 
of approximate reasoning. Thus decision-makers are forced to either guess, or use higher 
order judgements such as their philosophy. In fact, Plessner and Betsch acknowledge that 
participants may “shift their criterion for awarding a penalty to the same team to a higher 
level” (p.258). Thus they may accurately attribute these judgements to a “fair play” type of 
bias that is likely to form part of the participants’ philosophy, but which could be very 
different to their action in a real-world setting. 
Just to complicate matters, however, research into the judgments of air defense 
personnel (Adelman, Bresnick, Black, Marvin & Sak, 1996; Adelman, Tolcott & Bresnick, 
1993) predicted and showed a more pronounced order bias in naturalistic tests when 
compared to pencil and paper tests. Thus, given an analysis of the reasons that underpin 
decisions, to test the extent of such bias in this study, it may actually prove to be even more 
prevalent than Plessner and Betsch propound. Clearly, however, without examining the 
reasons that underpin decisions, their results remain speculative. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Currently, there is no benchmark in refereeing research since it is such a new area 
and, as such, Plessner and Betsch should be applauded for their scientifically rigorous and 
“tight” investigation. However, this study of human judgment bias presents a lab-based test 
that unfortunately may be too sterile and too contrived to generalize to the real-world 
refereeing environment. If the results are to be applied with any confidence, realistic 
conditions, as offered under the banner of naturalistic decision making, provides the most 
appropriate paradigm (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Pruitt, 1996). In the future, research on 
referee performance should consider a naturalistic environment that demands an 
ecologically valid perspective, accounts for the extreme time pressures in which referees 
must make judgments, and looks at how experts make decisions (Klein, 1997; Orasanu & 
Connolly, 1993; Zsambok, 1997) through consideration of their reasoning. 
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